Elections Industry: Voting system technical material, manuals, troubleshooting

By January 8, 2014 Uncategorized No Comments
[Last updated: 02/15/14] Are you wondering how electronic voting systems fit together? What an error message means when you see it on a voting machine? How voter lists work? How vulnerable the system used in your location is?

Black Box Voting has been collecting hard-to-obtain details for 10 years. If you have obtained information, you may contribute it either anonymously or with attribution, by mailing to: Black Box Voting 330 SW 143rd St Suite K PMB 547 Renton WA 98057, or contact Bev Harris.

To find out what voting system used in any US location, refer to the Verifier at VerifiedVoting.org: http://www.verifiedvoting.org/verifier/ — for locations outside the US, see if your country report is available here: http://blackboxvoting.org/reports/place/

Be sure to check the “Last updated” date at beginning of this page because new documents are added as we receive them.

ACCENTURE

Voter registration and voter history program; uses program originally created by ELECTION.COM

Accenture contracted with Tennessee, Colorado, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, among other states to provide the statewide voter list programs. Most locations abandoned Accenture due to problems with the software, but apparently the system is still used in several locations, sometimes bought out by state or county. The documents below provide insight into what became a customized implementation of Accenture/Election.com voter list software in Shelby County, Tennessee:

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/accenture/accenture-voter-list-program-dts-agent-user-documentation.pdf (299 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/accenture/accenture-voter-list-program-election.com-install-help-and-instructions.pdf (165 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/accenture/accenture-voter-list-program-exporting-to-ms-word-format.pdf (219 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/accenture/accenture-voter-list-program-release-notes.pdf (35 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/accenture/accenture-voter-list-program-functional-requirements.pdf (1,494KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/accenture/accenture-voter-list-program-open-tickets.pdf (28 KB)

Full program installation kit: http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/accenture/2.0_8-23-04.zip (large: allow time to download. 316,000 KB)

DIEBOLD (has also operated under Global Election Systems; Premier election Systems; Dominion Voting; and Election Systems & Software (ES&S)

Start with the Diebold portion of Ohio EVEREST review, below: Conducted by a team of researchers by request of former Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner, this report provides one of the best and easiest to follow overviews for how all the various Diebold components work together. It provides schematic diagrams, a description of each component, and an analysis of security and design problems. The report does not address the likelier scenarios for election tampering, involving inside access; therefore, the security issues, while interesting, are over-complicated. When reading the report, think between the lines: With all these vulnerabilities, what could a technician do with administrative privileges and a full set of permissions?

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/EVEREST-Diebold-Premier.pdf (3.99 MB)

Then examine the proof of concept reports by Black Box Voting, showing how both Diebold optical scan and touch-screen systems can be used to tamper with election results:
Black Box Voting report: Tampering with Diebold optical scan using memory card:
http://blackboxvoting.org/BBVreport.pdf (1.09 MB)

Black Box Voting report: Tampering with Diebold TSx touchscreen:
http://blackboxvoting.org/BBVreportIIunredacted.pdf (330 KB)
http://blackboxvoting.org/BBVreportII-supplement-unredacted.pdf (350 KB)

Diebold systems have been using a customized variant of C++ language, an interpretive code they call AccuBasic. Here is a document which partially describes AccuBasic:
http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/diebold-accubasic-developers-reference-manual-ab-manual.pdf (208.52 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/diebold-accufeed-users-guide-revision-1.pdf (219.52 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/diebold-accuproject-sales-brochure.pdf (1.68 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/diebold-accuvote-optical-scan-1.96-precinct-count-users-guide-revision-1.0.pdf (1.92 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/diebold-accuvote-optical-scan-central-count-users-guide-revision-1.pdf (460.01 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/diebold-accuvote-optical-scan-hardware-guide-revision-2.0.pdf (942.21 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/diebold-accuvote-optical-scan-precinct-count-1.94-users-guide-rev-2.pdf (2.42 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/diebold-accuvote-to-digi-port-server-ii.pdf (88.57 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/diebold-accuvote-version-1.94-hardware-guide-revision-1.2.pdf (716.98 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/diebold-ballot-200200024.tiff (119.38 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/diebold-ballot-specifications-revision-2.0.pdf (301.62 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/diebold-central-count-installation-guide.pdf (77.37 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/diebold-developers-guide-central-count-DLLMAN.pdf (1.01 MB)

Diebold ExpressPoll electronic poll book:
http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/diebold-expresspoll-EP4000-brochure.pdf (188.79 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/diebold-gems-18-14-release-notes-Readme1-18-14.pdf (240.28 KB)

Assignment list for several locations using the Diebold GEMS election management system:
http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/diebold-gems-assignment.pdf (1.39 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/diebold-gems-communication-protocol.pdf (42.51 KB)

Sales description of Diebold absentee vote mailing and signature authentication system:
http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/diebold-vote-remote-sales-brochure.pdf (923.49 KB)

A test lab report for Diebold system by Wyle Laboratories:
http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/diebold-wyle1-96.6-pt2.pdf (41.07 MB)

Diebold GEMS election management system user guide:
http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/GEMS_1.18_Users_Guide_Revision_12.pdf (13.29 MB)

Another version of GEMS user manual:
http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/gemsmanual82002.pdf (12.01 MB)

Working full installation kit for Diebold GEMS system:
http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/GEMSIS-1-18-17-27358.zip (Very large, allow time to download: 28.23 MB)

GEMS database from Alaska 2004 general election; note that this database was tampered with in 2006 prior to delivering it per court order to the Alaska Democratic Party in a lawsuit. The tampering redefined reporting sets, added a memory card, and changed defining characteristics for certain race sets, producing internal conflicts in the database causing the Statement of Votes Cast Report to “break” such that it no longer displays candidate names, and crashes altogether when attempting to review reports containing the altered data:
http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/alaska/copy_of_state_of_alaska_2004_general_election_certified.zip (Very large file; 1.83 MB, allow time to download)

GEMS database from Marin County Calif. June 2010 election; note that this database indicates unusual activity processing absentee ballots, with a number of aborted batches followed by trend reversals in the Veolia Water ballot question. Unlike the Alaska database, it is intact and all reports function properly.
http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/diebold/june10-primaryFINAL.zip (very large file; 28.23 MB; allow time to download)

ELECTION SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE (ES&S)

Start with the ES&S portion of Ohio EVEREST review, below: Conducted by a team of researchers by request of former Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner, this report provides one of the best and easiest to follow overviews for how all the various ES&S components work together. It provides schematic diagrams, a description of each component, and an analysis of security and design problems. The report does not address the likelier scenarios for election tampering, involving inside access; therefore, the security issues, while interesting, are over-complicated. When reading the report, think between the lines: With all these vulnerabilities, what could a technician do with administrative privileges and a full set of permissions?

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/ESS/ESS-EVEREST.pdf (2,285 KB)

The above report explains what each component does. Below are operational manuals and user guides for most components described in the EVEREST review.

ES&S Model 100 (“M100”) paper ballot scanner:

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/ESS/ESS-m100-operator-manual.pdf (1,574 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/ESS/ESS-m100-maintenance-manual.pdf (1,679 KB)

ES&S Model 650 (“M650”) central count paper ballot scanner:

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/ESS/ESS-m650-operator-manual.pdf (4,680 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/ESS/ESS-m650-pre-election-day-checklist.pdf (687 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/ESS/ESS-m650-election-day-checklist.pdf (693 KB)

ES&S iVotronic touch-screen DRE voting machines:

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/ESS/ESS-ivotronic-operator-manual.pdf (4,645 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/ESS/ESS-ivotronic-testing.pdf (193 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/ESS/ESS-ivotronic-test-report-DRE1.pdf (3,837 KB)

ES&S Unity system (this is the system that controls it all):

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/ESS/ESS-unity-bim-userguide.pdf (11,127 KB) (Ballot setup)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/ESS/ESS-unity-dam-userguide.pdf (4,881 KB) (Results aggregation)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/ESS/ESS-unity-edm-userguide.pdf (13,203 KB) (Database setup; can be bypassed and/or overridden with other components)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/ESS/ESS-unity-erm-userguide-pt1of2.pdf (11,662 KB) (first half of election reporting component)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/ESS/ESS-unity-erm-userguide-pt2of2.pdf (10,013 KB) (second half of election reporting component)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/ESS/ESS-unity-hpm-userguide-pt1of3.pdf (4,291 KB) (Part 1 of 3, hardware programming, an adjustable “bridge” middleman between components)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/ESS/ESS-unity-hpm-userguide-pt1of3.pdf (4,169 KB) (Part 2 of 3, hardware programming “bridge”)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/ESS/ESS-unity-hpm-userguide-pt3of3.pdf (4,025 KB) (Part 3 of 3, hardware programming “bridge”)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/ESS/ESS-unity-online.pdf (3,726 KB) (Online training program)

Miscellaneous:

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/ESS/ESS-tips-for-secure-election.pdf (1,534 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/ESS/ESS-corporate-glossary.pdf (1,461 KB)

HART INTERCIVIC

Start with the Hart portion of Ohio EVEREST review, below: Conducted by a team of researchers by request of former Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner, this report provides one of the best and easiest to follow overviews for how all the various Hart components work together. It provides schematic diagrams, a description of each component, and an analysis of security and design problems. The report does not address the likelier scenarios for election tampering, involving inside access; therefore, the security issues, while interesting, are over-complicated. When reading the report, think between the lines: With all these vulnerabilities, what could a technician do with administrative privileges and a full set of permissions?

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/EVEREST-Hart.pdf (421.98 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-ballot-now-operations-manual-V.1.3.pdf (5.99 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-ballot-now-operations-manual-V.1.4.pdf (6.97 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-ballot-now-operations-manual-V.1.5.pdf (6.99 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-ballot-now-training-manual-S.W-2.8.pdf (3.06 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-boss-eslate-operations-manual-Boss-Ballot-Orig-S.W-V2.9.pdf (22.34 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-boss-operations-manual-V.2.7.pdf (24.48 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-boss-operations-manual-V.2.8.pdf (23.69 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-changes-to-boss-system-2.1.pdf (197.42 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-corporate-overview-info.pdf (394.96 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-dau-5000-voting-unit-setup.pdf (767.98 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-early-vote-manual-b.pdf (2.55 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-election-day-manual.pdf (3.09 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-error-messages.pdf (214.7 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-eslate-boss-administrative-databases-V.2.5.pdf (19.56 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-eslate-boss-training-manual-BOSS-V.2.8.pdf (4.92 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-eslate-fast-trac-operations-manual-V.01.03.00.pdf (925.66 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-eslate-jbc-battery-pack-test-procedure.pdf (315.65 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-eslate-polling-place-desk-reference.pdf (4.23 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-eslate-product-description.pdf (1.99 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-eslate-quick-reference.pdf (471.7 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-eslate-sales-literature.pdf (831.51 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-eslate-support-procedures-training-manual.pdf (39.29 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-eslate-tally-system-operations-manual-rev.m.pdf (12.11 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-eslate-tally-system-operations-manual-2.8.pdf (13.22 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-eslate-votingprocess-travis-county-tx.png (34.88 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-instructions-copying-boss-tally-to-cd.pdf (252.04 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-instructions-for-copying-boss-database.pdf (230 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-management-tasks-and-training-manual.pdf (4.87 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-mbb-card-utility-tool.pdf (230.52 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-operating-system-setup-boss-tally-and-ballot-now.pdf (332.62 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-poll-workers-eslate-desk-reference.pdf (2.37 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-precinct-voting-system-data-viewer.pdf (447.91 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-programming-eslate-V.1.11-to-1.09.pdf (234.4 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-programming-eslate-V1.09-to-1.11.pdf (218.43 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-resetting-jbc-and-eslate.pdf (206.62 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-sample-ballot.pdf (278.18 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-servo-eslate-operations-manual-V.1.0-w.appendix.pdf (4.15 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-servo-eslate-operations-manual-V.1.0.pdf (3.35 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-servo-eslate-operations-manual-V.1.02.pdf (4.42 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-setup-procedures-including-boss-tally-and-ballot-now-rev.1.pdf (730.39 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-setup-procedures-including-boss-tally-and-ballot-now-rev.a.pdf (874.84 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-system-2.1-changes.pdf (336.41 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-tally-training-manual-V2.8-compatible.pdf (2.52 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-troubleshooting-dead-or-nonresponding-eslate.pdf (247.26 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-user-manual-changes-V.2.1.pdf (298.33 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-using-card-utility.pdf (197.24 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-using-jbc-recovery.pdf (225.64 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-vvpat-sales-literature.pdf (79.47 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/hart/hart-white-paper-lcd-dre.pdf (242.86 KB)

SEQUOIA VOTING SYSTEMS (Has also operated under the name Dominion Voting Systems)

The AVC Edge is a Sequoia touchscreen EVM, or DRE system.
http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/sequoia/sequoia-avc-edge-operators-manual.pdf (5.33 MB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/sequoia/sequoia-avc-edge-pollworker-manual.pdf (946.28 KB)

http://blackboxvoting.org/docs/sequoia/sequoia-card-activator-pollworker-manual.pdf (859.15 KB)

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Concepts:

Election transparency: Election transparency is the public ability to see and verify each essential step in elections, the essential steps being: (1) who can vote (voter list), (2) who did vote (poll list, or participating voter list), (3) counting of the vote, and (4) chain of custody. More: http://blackboxvoting.org/transparency/

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